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Abstract
We aim to develop a computationally feasible, cognitively-
inspired, formal model of concept invention, drawing on
Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of conceptual blending, and
grounding it on a sound mathematical theory of concepts.
Conceptual blending, although successfully applied to de-
scribing combinational creativity in a varied number of fields,
has barely been used at all for implementing creative compu-
tational systems, mainly due to the lack of sufficiently precise
mathematical characterisations thereof. The model we will
define will be based on Goguen’s proposal of a Unified Con-
cept Theory, and will draw from interdisciplinary research
results from cognitive science, artificial intelligence, formal
methods and computational creativity. To validate our model,
we will implement a proof of concept of an autonomous
computational creative system that will be evaluated in two
testbed scenarios: mathematical reasoning and melodic har-
monisation. We envisage that the results of this project will
be significant for gaining a deeper scientific understanding
of creativity, for fostering the synergy between understand-
ing and enhancing human creativity, and for developing new
technologies for autonomous creative systems.
Introduction
Of the three forms of creativity put forward in (Boden
1990)—combinational, exploratory, and transformational—
the most difficult to capture computationally turned out to
be the combinational type (Boden 2009), i.e., when novel
ideas (concepts, theories, solutions, works of art) are pro-
duced through unfamiliar combinations of familiar ideas.
Although generating novel ideas, or concepts, by combining
old ones is not complicated in principle, the difficulty lies in
doing this in a computationally tractable way, and in being
able to recognise the value of newly invented concepts for
better understanding a certain domain; even without it being
specifically sought—i.e., by ‘serendipity’ (Boden 1990, p.
234), (Pease et al. 2013).
To address this problem, we will concentrate on an im-
portant development that has significantly influenced the
current understanding of the general cognitive principles
operating during creative thinking, namely Fauconnier and
Turner’s theory of conceptual blending, also known as con-
ceptual integration (Fauconnier and Turner 1998). Faucon-
nier and Turner proposed conceptual blending as the fun-
damental cognitive operation underlying much of every-
Figure 1: ‘Houseboat’ blend, adapted from (Goguen and
Harrell 2010)
day thought and language, and modelled it as a process by
which people subconsciously combine particular elements
and their relations, of originally separate mental spaces, into
a unified space, in which new elements and relations emerge,
and new inferences can be drawn. For instance, a ‘house-
boat’ or a ‘boathouse’ are not simply the intersection of the
concepts of ‘house’ and ‘boat’. Instead, the concepts ‘house-
boat’ and ‘boathouse’ selectively integrate different aspects
of the source concepts in order to produce two new concepts,
each with its own distinct internal structure (see Figure 1 for
the ‘houseboat’ blend).
The cognitive, psychological and neural basis of concep-
tual blending has been extensively studied (Fauconnier and
Turner 2003; Gibbs, Jr. 2000; Baron and Osherson 2011).
Moreover, Fauconnier and Turner’s theory has been success-
fully applied for describing existing blends of ideas and con-
cepts in a varied number of fields, such as linguistics, mu-
sic theory, poetics, mathematics, theory of art, political sci-
ence, discourse analysis, philosophy, anthropology, and the
study of gesture and of material culture (Turner 2012). How-
ever, the theory has hardly been used for implementing cre-
ative computational systems. Indeed, since Fauconnier and
Turner did not aim at computer models of cognition, they
did not develop their theory in sufficient detail for concep-
tual blending to be captured algorithmically. Consequently,
the theory is silent on issues that are relevant if conceptual
blending is to be used as a mechanism for designing creative
systems: it does not specify how input spaces are retrieved;
or which elements and relations of these spaces are to be
projected into the blended space; or how these elements and
relations are to be further combined; or how new elements
and relations emerge; or how this new structure is further
used in creative thinking (i.e., how the blend is “run”). Con-
ceptual blending theory does not specify how novel blends
are constructed.
Nevertheless, a number of researchers in the field of com-
putational creativity have recognised the potential value of
Fauconnier and Turner’s theory for guiding the implementa-
tion of creative systems, and some computational accounts
of conceptual blending have already been proposed (Veale
and O’Donoghue 2000; Pereira 2007; Goguen and Harrell
2010; Thagard and Stewart 2011). They attempt to con-
cretise some of Fauconnier and Turner’s insights, and the
resulting systems have shown interesting and promising re-
sults in creative domains such as interface design, narrative
style, poetry generation, and visual patterns. All of these
accounts, however, are customised realisations of concep-
tual blending, which are strongly dependent on hand-crafted
representations of domain-specific knowledge, and are lim-
ited to very specific forms of blending. The major obstacle
for a general account of computational conceptual blending
is currently the lack of a mathematically precise theory that
is suitable for the rigorous development of creative systems
based on conceptual blending.
A Formal Model of Conceptual Blending
To address the relative lack of study of the computational
potential of conceptual blending, in the FP7-ICT project
COINVENT1, we are setting out to:
1. develop a novel, computationally feasible, formal model
of conceptual blending that is sufficiently precise to cap-
ture the fundamental insights of Fauconnier and Turner’s
theory, while being general enough to address the syntac-
tic and semantic heterogeneity of knowledge representa-
tions;
2. gain a deeper understanding of conceptual blending and
its potential role in computational creativity, by linking
this novel formal model to relevant, cognitively-inspired
computational models, such as analogical and case-based
reasoning, induction, semantic alignment, and coherence-
based reasoning;
3. design a generic, creative computational system based on
this novel formal model, capable of serendipitous inven-
1www.coinvent-project.eu
tion and manipulation of novel abstract concepts, enhanc-
ing thus the creativity of humans when this system is
instantiated to particular application domains for which
conceptual blending is a core process of creative think-
ing;
4. validate the model and its computational realisation in two
representative working domains: mathematics and music.
The only attempt so far to provide a general and mathe-
matically precise account of conceptual blending has been
put forward by Goguen, initially as part of algebraic semi-
otics (Goguen 1999), and later in the context of a wider the-
ory of concepts: Unified Concept Theory (Goguen 2005a).
He has also shown its aptness for formalising information
integration (Goguen 2005b) and reasoning about space and
time (Goguen 2006).
Goguen’s intuition was that conceptual blending could
be modelled based on the colimit construct of category
theory—a field of abstract mathematics that has provided
deep insights in mathematical logic and computer science,
and has often been used as a guide for finding good defini-
tions and research directions. In his Categorical Manifesto,
he intuitively describes this construct as follows: “Given a
category of widgets, the operation of putting a system of
widgets together to form some super-widget corresponds to
taking the colimit of the diagram of widgets that shows how
to interconnect them.” (Goguen 1991)
To model conceptual blending we would start with a
collection of input spaces—Goguen defines them as semi-
otic spaces of signs and their relations—and of structure-
preserving mappings between them, capturing how the
structure of these spaces is related. The colimit would be
the optimal way to put these spaces together into one sin-
gle space taking into account how they were originally con-
nected by structure-preserving mappings. Here ‘optimal’
means that the colimit includes all structure of the input
spaces, but not more; and that it would not make unneces-
sary fusion of structure. An important property of colimits
is that they are unique up to isomorphism. But since con-
ceptual blending does not operate in general under this no-
tion of optimality, Goguen suggested to extend this idea by
including a notion of ‘quality’ of structure-preserving map-
pings between mental spaces to cope with the idea of partial
mappings that selectively map only certain structure into the
blend, and to model conceptual blends as colimits in this
extended setting.
As it stands, Goguen’s account is still very abstract and
lacks concrete algorithmic descriptions. There are several
reasons, though, that make it an appropriate candidate theory
on which to ground the formal model we are aiming at:
• It is an important contribution towards the unification of
several formal theories of concepts, including the geomet-
rical conceptual spaces of (Ga¨rdenfors 2004), the sym-
bolic conceptual spaces of (Fauconnier 1994), the infor-
mation flow of (Barwise and Seligman 1997), the formal
concept analysis of (Ganter and Wille 1999), and the lat-
tice of theories of (Sowa 2000). This makes it possible
to potentially draw from existing algorithms that have al-
ready been developed in the scope of each of these frame-
works.
• It covers any formal logic, even multiple logics, support-
ing thus the integration and processing of concepts un-
der various forms of syntactic and semantic heterogene-
ity. This is important, since we cannot assume concep-
tual spaces represented in a homogeneous manner across
diverse domains. Current tools for heterogeneous specifi-
cations such as Hets (Mossakowski, Maeder, and Lu¨ttich
2007) allow parsing, static analysis and proof manage-
ment incorporating various provers and different specifi-
cation languages.
By developing a formal model of conceptual blending
building on Goguen’s initial account, we aim to provide gen-
eral principles that will guide the design of computer sys-
tems capable of inventing new higher-level, more abstract
concepts and representations out of existing, more concrete
concepts and interactions with the environment, and to do so
based on the sound reuse and exploitation of existing com-
putational implementations of closely related models, such
as those for analogical and metaphorical reasoning (Falken-
hainer, Forbus, and Gentner 1989), semantic integration
(Schorlemmer and Kalfoglou 2008), or cognitive coherence
(Thagard 2000). With such a formal, but computationally
feasible model, we will ultimately bridge the existing gap
between the theoretical foundations of conceptual blending
and their computational realisations. This, in turn, will con-
tribute to the much-needed foundations for the design of cre-
ative systems that effectively enhance both artificial and hu-
man creativity when deployed in the kinds of genuinely cre-
ative tasks underlying the sort of abstract reasoning common
to many branches of the sciences and the arts.
Working Domains
To explore the genericity of the proposed formal model
of concept invention and of the computational realisation
we are after, we will focus on two representative working
domains of creativity: mathematics and music, “the most
sharply contrasted fields of intellectual activity which one
can discover, and yet bound together, supporting one another
as if they would demonstrate the hidden bond which draws
together all activities of our mind, and which also in the rev-
elations of artistic genius leads us to surmise unconscious
expressions of a mysteriously active intelligence,” as noted
wisely in (von Helmholtz 1885).
In mathematics, the creative act of providing novel defi-
nitions, conjectures, theorems, examples, counter-examples,
or proofs can be seen as particular cases of concept invention
(Montano-Rivas et al. 2012). In music, concept invention
may apply to the generation of new melodies, harmonies,
rhythms, or counterpoints (and their combination) (Mazzola,
Park, and Thalmann 2011), and to the integration of musi-
cal and textual spaces to achieve novel musical metaphors
(Zbikowski 2002).
The following examples illustrate the sort of creative ac-
tivity we want to address with our formal model and its com-
putational realisation.
Example 1 The historical example of the discovery of the
quaternions by Hamilton is one that is well documented
(e.g., (Hersh 2011)), so much is known about the interme-
diate steps involved in the discovery. This can be treated by
our approach, by taking the starting point as the unproblem-
atic blend between the algebraic structure of the complex
numbers as a field (with addition, multiplication and divi-
sion), and the geometric structure of the 2-dimensional real
plane as a real vector space (with addition, and scalar mul-
tiplication). In our terms, Hamilton wanted to find a similar
blend involving an algebraic structure corresponding to 3-
dimensional real vector space. He ended up, however, by
finding a blend involving a 4-dimensional real vector space,
and the algebra of the quaternions — which involves leaving
out from the algebraic theory the commutativity of multipli-
cation. We thus see the characteristic features of blending,
in the diagram of Figure 2, where the arrows indicate mor-
phisms in Unified Concept Theory. This shows the charac-
teristic features of blending, where:
• there are two given concepts: commutative fields, and (4-
dimensional) real vector spaces;
• a common concept, structurally similar to some aspects of
the given concepts is identified (Common);
• the initial concepts are blended, respecting the common
aspects,
• an initially inconsistent blended concept of quaternions is
obtained;
• this is modified by dropping an initial feature (commuta-
tivity of multiplication), to obtain a consistent concept.
Figure 2: Blend for quaternions.
By deploying COINVENT-based technology in this
working domain, our ultimate goal is to transcend the capa-
bilities of current state-of-the-art automated reasoning sup-
port tools, which as of today are reluctantly accepted by their
users and perceived more as an obstacle to than a facilitator
of creative thinking. The choice of the domain of mathemat-
ics is further supported by the following reasons:
• Evidence from cognitive science, education, and history
of mathematics suggests that the hierarchy of mathemati-
cal concepts is grounded on some simple numerical abili-
ties humans have, combined with know-how about physi-
cal scenarios of interaction with the environment (Lakatos
1976; Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez 2000). This means that by tack-
ling the case of mathematics, we need to address problems
concerning the situatedness of agents.
• The span of usage of mathematical concepts goes from
rather concrete situations (children learning to count how
many toys you give them) to the very abstract (as when
professional mathematicians do research) — see (Lakoff
and Nu´n˜ez 2000; Alexander 2011).
• Mathematics allows us to explore the social dimension of
concept invention and the forces external to cognition that
shape the process of conceptual blending over time, cru-
cial in educational and research environments (Lakatos
1976; Goguen 1997).
• Currently, there is no cognitive model of the way in which
people invent mathematical concepts; there are to our
knowledge no models of how humans create mathemat-
ics. Hence only a few computational creativity systems
exist that support creative mathematical thinking, such as
(Colton 2002).
Example 2 Devising appropriate chordal harmonisations
for melodies derived from non-Western cultures or, even,
for new creations could potentially be tackled computa-
tionally based on our approach. A computational system
could autonomously explore different chordal spaces gener-
ating novel harmonic combinations/blends appropriate for
the melodies at hand. This could be applied for the de-
sign of an interactive compositional tool or computer game
where the user inputs a melody (may ‘sing in’ a melody)
and the automatic harmonisation system produces interac-
tively novel harmonisations that creatively combine har-
monic properties from different music idioms. It could also
be applied, for instance, for video-game design and pro-
gramming, by endowing game creations with the capacity
of generating new harmonisations on-the-fly; the creative
melodic harmonisation assistant could provide appropriate
harmonisations following the mood changes or activity or
gestural patterns emerging as the game unfolds. In Figure
3, a traditional melody is harmonised in radically different
ways corresponding to individual harmonic spaces (tonal,
modal, atonal). The creative harmonisation assistant may
generate such original harmonisations or enable the emer-
gence of new unpredicted harmonisations stemming from
blends between such spaces.
By deploying COINVENT-based technology in this
working domain our ultimate goal is to be capable of mak-
ing software go beyond a mere application of compositional
rules, so as to refute the common belief that creativity is
separated from the computational processes used in music
composition, and that these processes just do uncreative cal-
culations. The choice of the domain of music is further sup-
ported by the following reasons:
• The conceptual level of music, together with the role of
cognitive models such as conceptual blending in musical
Figure 3: Four different harmonisations of a traditional
melody (first four-bar phrase) — harmonizations created by
C. Tsougras (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki).
analysis, has gained increased attention in the field of mu-
sic theory (Zbikowski 2002).
• A substantial body of contemporary research on mu-
sical creativity from the philosophy of computer mod-
elling, through music semiotics, education, performance
and neuroscience, to experimental psychology (Delie`ge
and Wiggins 2006; Mazzola, Park, and Thalmann 2011)
provides the necessary background for exploring compu-
tational creativity in a scientific manner in the domain of
music.
• Traditional music analysis has weak conceptual power for
studying complex constructions. Formal theories of musi-
cal structure and processes, as employed in contemporary
computational modelling of music (Anagnostopoulou and
Cambouropoulos 2012; Conklin and Anagnostopoulou
2006; Steedman 1996), are considered an adequate tool
for computer-aided composition of advanced music.
• The language of modern mathematics, whose conceptual
character has been stressed by contemporary mathemati-
cians (Lawvere and Shanuel 1997; Boulez and Connes
2011), has been advocated as a way forward in the anal-
ysis of its effectiveness in musical creativity (Future and
Emerging Technologies 2011).
• Musical creativity, particularly musical performance,
is ultimately contextualised, situated, and embodied
(Goguen 2004). In particular, in musical gesture theory,
conceptual blending has been suggested as a powerful
model of musical interpretation (Echard 2006).
We believe that the exploration of the domains of mathemat-
ics and music should reveal very general principles applica-
ble to other creative domains.
Relevant Prior Research
COINVENT is a collective effort to advance the understand-
ing of creativity through a precise formalisation of an im-
portant cognitive model and a concrete computational reali-
sation thereof. We shall do so informed by the main contri-
butions towards a science of creativity (Sternberg 1999) and
drawing from several foundational theories that have hith-
erto largely been pursued independently.
During the last decades, scholars and researchers in cog-
nitive linguistics and cognitive psychology have made sig-
nificant contributions to the understanding of the fundamen-
tal role that metaphor and analogy play in cognition (Lakoff
and Johnson 1980; Gentner, J.Holvoak, and Kokinov 2001;
Fauconnier and Turner 2003), at the same time that signif-
icant evidence has been gathered supporting a philosophy
of mind grounded on the embodiment of mind and meaning
(Maturana and Varela 1987; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch
1992; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Johnson 2007). This re-
search has been heavily influenced by the dramatic progress
in imaging techniques carried out in the field of neuro-
science, such as functional MRI.
In parallel, the development of the field of Category The-
ory has led to a remarkable unification and simplification of
mathematics (Mac Lane 1971; Lawvere and Shanuel 1997),
which has helped to reach a deep understanding across dif-
ferent fields such as computer science, mathematical logic,
physics, and linguistics. More recently, these techniques
have been applied to obtain some preliminary formalisa-
tions of conceptual metaphor and blending (Goguen 1999;
Old and Priss 2001; Guhe, Smaill, and Pease 2009) by ap-
plying techniques such as institution theory (Goguen and
Burstall 1992) or information flow theory (Barwise and
Seligman 1997), which are based on category theory.
Automated reasoning techniques from artificial intelli-
gence that are either based on cognitive principles such as
case-based reasoning (Aamodt and Plaza 1994) —grounded
on the prototype theory of categorisation (Rosch 1973) and
reasoning by analogy making (Gentner 1983)—or on for-
mal methods for inductive reasoning such as anti-unification
(Plotkin 1971) will be some of the seed technologies for the
computational realisation of our model. Some preliminary
steps have been made already, in joint research by some
of the consortium members of COINVENT, by taking ideas
from Lakatos (Lakatos 1976) and from (Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez
2000) as starting points and extending the HDTP system
(Heuristic-Driven Theory Projection, developed at the Uni-
versity of Osnabru¨ck (Gust, Ku¨hnberger, and Schmid 2006;
Schwering et al. 2009) and based on anti-unification) to give
a computational account of how these processes can give rise
to basic concepts of arithmetic (Guhe et al. 2011). Another
set of important seed technologies for COINVENT origi-
nates in research carried out originally at the University of
Bremen, and now at the University of Magdeburg, and ad-
dresses the knowledge representation and reasoning layer of
the project. This includes the distributed ontology language
DOL, currently standardised within the Object Management
Group OMG (www.ontoiop.org), a major international
effort with over 40 experts involved worldwide, and which
supports an extensible number of logical languages, major
modularisation and logical structuring techniques, and in
particular supports the specification of basic blending dia-
grams as formalised by Joseph Goguen. Moreover, the Hets
system2 will serve as a central, and extensible, reasoning in-
frastructure, with which other tools developed within COIN-
VENT will interface. Lastly, the technology developed in
the OntoHub.org project will allow the building of a ded-
icated semantic repository for formalised concepts in the
mathematics and music domains, supporting heterogeneous
specifications in a semantically-backed logical context, and
providing interfaces for sharing, browsing, and the integra-
tion of reasoning services. This repository will be hosted at
conceptportal.org.
In addition, the consortium members of COINVENT have
shown an important experience in the development and ap-
plication of the above foundational theories and seed tech-
nologies to a wide variety of fields, in computational cre-
ativity and other related areas: by studying the combina-
tion of case solutions and knowledge transfer in case-based
reasoning (CBR) (Ontan˜o´n and Plaza 2010; Ontan˜o´n and
Plaza 2012) and its application to computational creativity
(Ontan˜o´n and Plaza 2012; Arcos 2012); by providing formal
foundations for distributed reasoning with heterogeneous
logics and their representations (Mossakowski, Maeder, and
Lu¨ttich 2007), and by applying them to achieve seman-
tic alignment and integration (Schorlemmer and Kalfoglou
2008; Kutz, Mossakowski, and Lu¨cke 2010; Kalfoglou
and Schorlemmer 2010; Kutz et al. 2012); by propos-
ing novel architectures for coherence-driven, cognitively-
inspired (BDI) agents (Joseph et al. 2010) and computa-
tional frameworks for multi-agent interaction-based agree-
ment on concepts and their semantics (Ontan˜o´n and Plaza
2010; Atencia and Schorlemmer 2012); by formalising
Lakatos-style automated theorem proving (Colton and Pease
2004) and mathematical theory formation (Colton 2002).
Expected Contributions
We expect that a mathematically precise theory, as the one
we are proposing in the context of the COINVENT project,
will lead to the following contributions:
Theory and Technology. Computational implementations





1. Computational implementations are tools for exploring
implications of the ideas embedded in a particular model,
beyond the limits of human thinking. Thus, they are vehi-
cles of further scientific inquiry of the cognitive and psy-
chological processes that the model seeks to describe.
In this sense, the formal model coming out of the COIN-
VENT project, together with its computational realisa-
tion, will be an important tool for exploring the impli-
cations of Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of conceptual
blending for understanding creative thinking. One such
implication is the role concept creation and invention
plays in serendipitous reasoning, i.e., in recognising the
value of newly invented concepts not only for better un-
derstanding a certain domain, but even for advancing the
understanding of a previously unidentified problem that
was initially not the concern of inquiry. If our model
advances the understanding of implications such as how
serendipity might work, cognitive science and psychol-
ogy could take these results to explore serendipitous rea-
soning from a cognitive and psychological point of view.
This alone would already be an important step forward in
developing a science of creativity.
By grounding our research on Goguen’s proposal for a
Unified Concept Theory, we will build upon the deep un-
derstanding gained by relating different approaches to the
notion of concept invention, and do so on a firm mathe-
matical foundation that is consequently of great help in
providing precise descriptions of what can and should be
implemented in a computational system.
2. Computational implementations make a general model
that is usually stated in abstract terms more concrete, fa-
cilitating the study of its formal and computational prop-
erties, and guiding the design and implementation of com-
puter systems that attempt to display the cognitive capa-
bilities captured in the model. Hence, they provide direct
engineering advances.
We will demonstrate these advances through two pro-
totype implementations of autonomous creative systems
that display creative activity through the accomplishment
of concept creation and invention in the domains of math-
ematics and music. Ideally, these systems will be devel-
oped with the following properties:
• an ability to form abstractions over both semantic and
syntactic aspects of a domain;
• an ability to form new representations, by conceptual
blending;
• an ability to revise representations on the basis of new
concrete information that fits badly with the current
conceptualisation (using ideas from Lakatos); and
• heuristically guided algorithms to solve problems,
based on combinations of the above abilities.
If our intuitions are right about the power of conceptual
blending to boost the capabilities of autonomous creative
systems and our project is successful, our contribution
could go even beyond that direction, in developing novel
ways to use methodologies from cognitive science in sys-
tems engineering, and vice versa.
Working Domains. In the domain of mathematics, we
plan to build a computational system that aids mathemati-
cians in by supporting their reasoning at a conceptual level
and in their creative work, for example
• proposing potentially interesting novel definitions, theo-
ries, and conjectures that are motivated by conceptual (not
only formal) reasons, and
• evaluating the potential of such ideas when proposed by
the mathematician.
Not only mathematicians, but also others engaged in similar
sorts of reasoning, when developing new concepts and theo-
ries, can benefit greatly from the processes of building new
conceptualisations from combinations of existing conceptu-
alisations and particular examples and counter-examples.
The particular system we propose as our proof-of-concept
would be the first of its kind in mathematics, as it goes well
beyond what proof assistants do. More importantly, if, as we
intend, the system turns out to be judged by mathematicians
attractive and even potentially useful in their work of con-
ceptually advancing mathematics, this would open the door
to something not seen before. The system resulting from
this project will, therefore, be a showcase of how systems
like proof assistant systems can be improved so that they are
useful for mathematicians.
In the domain of music, we plan to build a pioneering
computational system that aids musicians in composition,
namely in melodic harmonisation, that allows exploration of
novel uncharted conceptual territories, for example
• proposing new harmonic concepts emerging from learned
harmonic spaces, examples and counter-examples;
• suggesting new harmonic conceptualisations emerging
from combinations/blends of different harmonic spaces
that give rise to potentially interesting new harmonies.
Computer-aided compositional systems are often ‘accused’
of merely replicating/mimicking given music styles and be-
ing confined to the initial musical space that has been explic-
itly modelled in the system. The creativity of such systems is
considered rather limited as the system cannot supersede its
built-in concepts and cannot generate new unforeseen con-
cepts. The particular system we propose as our proof-of-
concept would be the first of its kind that goes well beyond
what current melodic harmonisation systems are capable of
doing. It would open the way more generally to music/art
creativity assistance tools that enable people to explore the
borders of their artistic creativity by giving them new origi-
nal ideas for further exploration.
Measures of Creativity. The computational creativity
community needs concrete measures of evaluation to enable
us to make objective, falsifiable claims about progress made
from one version of a program to another, or for comparing
and contrasting different software systems for the same cre-
ative task. There are currently three main models of eval-
uation (Ritchie 2007; Colton, Pease, and Charnley 2011;
Jordanous 2011), but they are still rarely used, and there are
problems with each. We will extend these measures: for in-
stance, serendipity, which is an important aspect of human
creativity, currently does not feature in any of the evalua-
tion models. We will formulate ways of evaluating this and
other under-represented notions. We will also contribute to
the methodology of computational creativity by applying all
three models, as well the new measures we develop, to our
system and to other creative systems. One of the best ways
to evaluate and improve measures of creativity is to apply
them in a reflective manner. We will furthermore evaluate
each model of evaluation according to principles in the phi-
losophy of science, and survey other experts for ease of use
and adherence to intuitions about creativity.
Acknowledgements
The project COINVENT acknowledges the financial support
of the Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) programme
within the Seventh Framework Programme for Research of
the European Commission, under FET-Open Grant number:
611553.
References
Aamodt, A., and Plaza, E. 1994. Case-based reason-
ing: Foundational issues, methodological variations, and
system approaches. Artificial Intelligence Communications
7(1):39–52.
Alexander, J. 2011. Mathematical blending. Semiotica
2011(187):1–48.
Anagnostopoulou, C., and Cambouropoulos, E. 2012. Semi-
otic analysis and computational modeling: Two case studies
on works by Debussy and Xenakis. In Sheinberg, E., ed.,
Music Semiotics: A Network of Significations. Ashgate Pub-
lishing, Surrey, UK. 129–145.
Arcos, J. L. 2012. Music and similarity based reasoning. In
Soft Computing in Humanities and Social Sciences, volume
273 of Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing. Springer.
467–478.
Atencia, M., and Schorlemmer, M. 2012. An interaction-
based approach to semantic alignment. Journal of Web Se-
mantics 12–13:131–147.
Baron, S. G., and Osherson, D. 2011. Evidence for con-
ceptual combination in the left anterior temporal lobe. Neu-
roimage 55(4):1847–1852.
Barwise, J., and Seligman, J. 1997. Information Flow:
The Logic of Distributed Systems, volume 44 of Cambridge
Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Boden, M. A. 1990. The Creative Mind: Myths and Mech-
anisms. George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd.
Boden, M. A. 2009. Computer models of creativity. AI
Magazine.
Boulez, P., and Connes, A. 2011. La cre´ativite´ en musique
et en mathe´matique. A dialogue during the 3rd Interna-
tional Conference on Mathematics and Computation in Mu-
sic (MCM 2011).
Colton, S., and Pease, A. 2004. Lakatos-style automated
theorem modification. In Proceedings of the 16th Eureo-
pean Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI’2004, in-
cluding Prestigious Applicants of Intelligent Systems, PAIS
2004, Valencia, Spain, August 22-27, 2004.
Colton, S.; Pease, A.; and Charnley, J. 2011. Computational
creativity theory: The FACE and IDEA descriptive models.
In 2nd International Conference on Computational Creativ-
ity.
Colton, S. 2002. Automated Theory Formation in Pure
Mathematics. Distinguished Dissertations Series. Springer.
Conklin, D., and Anagnostopoulou, C. 2006. Segmental pat-
tern discovery in music. INFORMS Journal on Computing
18(3):285–293.
Delie`ge, I., and Wiggins, G., eds. 2006. Musical Creativity:
Multidisciplinary Research in Theory and Practice. Psy-
chology Press.
Echard, W. 2006. ‘Plays guitar without any hands’: Musical
movement and problems of immanence. In Gritten, A., and
King, E., eds., Music and Gesture. Ashgate.
Falkenhainer, B.; Forbus, K. D.; and Gentner, D. 1989. The
structure-mapping engine: Algorithm and examples. Artifi-
cial Intelligence 41(1):1–63.
Fauconnier, G., and Turner, M. 1998. Conceptual integra-
tion networks. Cognitive Science 22(2):133–187.
Fauconnier, G., and Turner, M. 2003. The Way We Think:
Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities.
New York: Basic Books.
Fauconnier, G. 1994. Mental Spaces. Cambridge University
Press.
Future and Emerging Technologies. 2011. Creativity and
ICT. FET consultation workshop. Report, European Com-
mission, Directorate-General Information Society and Me-
dia.
Ganter, B., and Wille, R. 1999. Formal Concept Analysis.
Springer.
Ga¨rdenfors, P. 2004. Conceptual Spaces. A Bradford Book.
Gentner, D.; J.Holvoak, K.; and Kokinov, B. N., eds. 2001.
The Analogical Mind. MIT Press.
Gentner, D. 1983. Structure-mapping: A theoretical frame-
work for analogy. Cognitive Science 7:155–170.
Gibbs, Jr., R. W. 2000. Making good psychology out of
blending theory. Cognitive Linguistics 11(3–4):347–358.
Goguen, J., and Burstall, R. 1992. Institutions: Abstract
model theory for specification and programming. Journal of
the ACM 39(1):95–146.
Goguen, J. A., and Harrell, D. F. 2010. Style: A compu-
tational and conceptual blending-based approach. In Arga-
mon, S.; Burns, K.; and Dubnov, S., eds., The Structure of
Style. Springer. chapter 12, 291–316.
Goguen, J. 1991. A categorical manifesto. Mathematical
Structures in Computer Science 1(49–67).
Goguen, J. 1997. Towards a social, ethical theory of infor-
mation. In Bowker, G.; Gasser, L.; Star, L.; and Turner, W.,
eds., Social Science Research, Technical Systems and Coop-
erative Work: Beyond the Great Devide. Erlbaum. 27–56.
Goguen, J. 1999. An introduction to algebraic semiotics,
with applications to user interface design. In Nehaniv, C. L.,
ed., Computation for Metaphors, Analogy, and Agents, vol-
ume 1562 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer.
242–291.
Goguen, J. 2004. Musical qualia, context, time, and emo-
tion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(3/4):117–147.
Goguen, J. 2005a. What is a concept? In Dau, F.; Mugnier,
M.-L.; and Stumme, G., eds., Conceptual Structures: Com-
mon Semantics for Sharing Knowledge. 13th International
Conference on Conceptual Structures, ICCS 2005, Kassel,
Germany, July 17-22, 2005. Proceedings, volume 3596 of
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 52–77. Springer.
Goguen, J. 2005b. Information integration in institutions. To
appear in a memorial volume for Jon Barwise edited by L.
Moss. Draft available at http://www.cs.ucsd.edu/
users/goguen/pps/ifi04.pdf.
Goguen, J. 2006. Mathematical models of cognitive space
and time. In Andler, D.; Ogawa, Y.; Okada, M.; and Watan-
abe, S., eds., Reasoning and Cognition, volume 2 of Inter-
disciplinary Conference Series on Reasoning Studies. Keio
University Press.
Guhe, M.; Pease, A.; Smaill, A.; Martı´nez, M.; Schmidt,
M.; Gust, H.; Ku¨hnberger, K.-U.; and Krumnack, U. 2011.
A computational account of conceptual blending in basic
mathematics. Cognitive Systems Research 12(3–4):249–
265.
Guhe, M.; Smaill, A.; and Pease, A. 2009. Using informa-
tion flow for modelling mathematical metaphors. In Howes,
A.; Peebles, D.; and Cooper, R. P., eds., Proceedings of the
9th International Conference on Cognitive Modeling (ICCM
2009).
Gust, H.; Ku¨hnberger, K.-U.; and Schmid, U. 2006.
Metaphors and heuristic-driven theory projection (hdtp).
Theoretical Computer Science 354(1):98–117.
Hersh, R. 2011. From counting to quaternions – the agonies
and ecstasies of the student repeat those of d’Alembert and
Hamilton. Journal of Humanistic Mathematics 1(1):65–93.
Johnson, M. 2007. The Meaning of the Body. The University
of Chicago Press.
Jordanous, A. 2011. Evaluating evaluation: Assessing
progress in computational creativity research. In Proceed-
ings of the Second International Conference on Computa-
tional Creativity (ICCCX) Mexico City, Mexico.
Joseph, S.; Sierra, C.; Schorlemmer, M.; and Dellunde, P.
2010. Deductive coherence and norm adoption. Logic Jour-
nal of the IGPL 18(1):118–156.
Kalfoglou, Y., and Schorlemmer, M. 2010. The information-
flow approach to ontology-based semantic integration. In
Poli, R.; Healey, M.; and Kameas, A., eds., Theory and Ap-
plications of Ontology: Computer Applicactions. Springer.
chapter 4, 101–114.
Kutz, O.; Mossakowski, T.; Hois, J.; Bhatt, M.; and Bate-
man, J. 2012. Ontology blending in DOL. In Besold,
T. R.; Ku¨hnberger, K.-U.; Schorlemmer, M.; and Smaill, A.,
eds., Computational Creativity, Concept Invention and Gen-
eral Intelligence. 1st International Workshop. Montpellier,
France, August 27, 2012.
Kutz, O.; Mossakowski, T.; and Lu¨cke, D. 2010. Car-
nap, Goguen, and the Hyperontologies: Logical Pluralism
and Heterogeneous Structuring in Ontology Design. Logica
Universalis 4(2):255–333.
Lakatos, I. 1976. Proofs and Refutations. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Lakoff, G., and Johnson, M. 1980. Metaphors We Live By.
University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, G., and Johnson, M. 1999. Philosophy in the Flesh.
Basic Books.
Lakoff, G., and Nu´n˜ez, R. E. 2000. Where Mathematics
Comes From. Basic Books.
Lawvere, F. W., and Shanuel, S. H. 1997. Conceptual Math-
ematics. Cambridge University Press.
Mac Lane, S. 1971. Categories for the Working Mathemati-
cian. Springer.
Maturana, H. R., and Varela, F. J. 1987. The Tree of
Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understand-
ing. Shambhala.
Mazzola, G.; Park, J.; and Thalmann, F. 2011. Musical
Creativity: Strategies and Tools in Composition and Impro-
visation. Computational Music Science. Springer.
Montano-Rivas, O.; McCasland, R.; Dixon, L.; and Bundy,
A. 2012. Scheme-based theorem discovery and concept
invention. Expert Systems with Applications 39:1637–1646.
Mossakowski, T.; Maeder, C.; and Lu¨ttich, K. 2007. The
Heterogeneous Tool Set. In Grumberg, O., and Huth, M.,
eds., Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analy-
sis of Systems. 13th International Conference, TACAS 2007,
Held as Part of the Joint European Conferences on The-
ory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2007 Braga, Portu-
gal, March 24 - April 1, 2007. Proceedings, volume 4424 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 519–522. Springer.
Old, L. J., and Priss, U. 2001. Metaphor and information
flow. In Proceedings of the 12th Midwest Artificial Intelli-
gence and Cognitive Science Conference, 99–104.
Ontan˜o´n, S., and Plaza, E. 2010. Amalgams: A formal ap-
proach for combining multiple case solutions. In ICCBR’10:
18th International Conference on Case-Based Reasoning,
volume 6176 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 257–
271. Springer.
Ontan˜o´n, S., and Plaza, E. 2012. Toward a knowledge trans-
fer model of case-based inference. In Twenty-Fifth Interna-
tional Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Con-
ference, 341–346. AAAI Press.
Pease, A.; Colton, S.; Ramezani, R.; Charnley, J.; and Reed,
K. 2013. A discussion on serendipity in creative systems.
In Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on
Computational Creativity.
Pereira, F. C. 2007. Creativity and Artificial Intelligence,
volume 4 of Applications of Cognitive Linguistics. Mouton
de Bruyter.
Plotkin, G. D. 1971. A further note on inductive generaliza-
tion. Machine Intelligence 6:101–124.
Ritchie, G. 2007. Some empirical criteria for attributing cre-
ativity to a computer program. Minds and Machines 17:67–
99.
Rosch, E. H. 1973. Natural categories. Cognitive Psychol-
ogy 4(3):328–350.
Schorlemmer, M., and Kalfoglou, Y. 2008. Institutionalis-
ing ontology-based semantic integration. Applied Ontology
3(3):131–150.
Schwering, A.; Krumnack, U.; Ku¨hnberger, K.-U.; and
Gust, H. 2009. Syntactic principles of heuristic-driven the-
ory projection. Cognitive Systems Research 10(3):251–269.
Sowa, J. F. 2000. Knowledge Representation:
Logical, Philosophical, and Computational Foundations.
Brooks/Cole.
Steedman, M. 1996. The blues and the abstract truth: Music
and mental models. In Garnham, A., and Oakhill, J., eds.,
Mental Models in Cognitive Science. Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
Sternberg, R. J., ed. 1999. Handbook of Creativity. Oxford
University Press.
Thagard, P., and Stewart, T. C. 2011. The AHA! expe-
rience: Creativity through emergent binding in neural net-
works. Cognitive Science 35:1–33.
Thagard, P. 2000. Coherence in Thought and Action. Life
and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology.
MIT Press.
Turner, M. 2012. Blending and conceptual integration.
http://markturner.org/blending.html.
Varela, F. J.; Thompson, E. T.; and Rosch, E. 1992. The
Embodied Mind. MIT Press.
Veale, T., and O’Donoghue, D. 2000. Computation and
blending. Cognitive Linguistics 11(3/4):253–281.
von Helmholtz, H. 1885. On the Sensations of Tone. Long-
mans & Co.
Zbikowski, L. M. 2002. Conceptualizing Music. Oxford
University Press.
